

Anderson, Elizabeth. Value in ethics and economics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993

1 • A Pluralist Theory of Value

1.1 A Rational Attitude Theory of Value

People experience the world as infused with many different values. Friendships can be intimate, or merely convenient, charged with sexual excitement, or mellow. A subway station can be confining, menacing, and dumpy, or spacious, welcoming, and sleek. When people attribute goodness or badness to some thing, person, relationship, act, or state of affairs, they usually do so in some respect or other: as dashing, informative, or tasty, delightful, trustworthy, or honorable, or as corrupt, cruel, odious, horrifying, dangerous, or ugly. Our evaluative experiences, and the judgments based on them, are deeply pluralistic.

I aim to explain and vindicate this pluralism of ordinary evaluative thought and to develop some of its practical and theoretical implications. This requires an investigation into the ways people relate to goods: in experiencing values, in valuing or caring about things, in expressing and justifying value judgments. Understanding these phenomena will help us home in on what it is to be good and how we know things to be good.

The suggestion that we have evaluative experiences has struck many philosophers as metaphysically eerie: science has discovered no "evaluative facts," or any organs of "moral sense," that enable us to discern the properties of "good" and "bad" in the world (Mackie 1977, pp. 38–42). We can dispel this mystery by recalling what ordinary experiences of value are like. We experience things not as simply good or bad, but as good or bad in particular respects that elicit distinct responses in us. There is nothing mysterious about finding a dessert delectable, a joke hilarious, a soccer match exhilarating, a revolution liberating. We also can find someone's compliments cloying, a task burdensome, a speech boring. To experience something as good is to be favorably aroused by it—to be

inspired, attracted, interested, pleased, awed. To experience it as bad is to be unfavorably aroused by it—to be shocked, offended, disgusted, irritated, bored, pained. Evaluative experiences are experiences of things as arousing particular positive or negative emotional responses in us.

Evaluative experiences are relevant to questions concerning the good because they typically arouse or express our concerns about what we experience. Valuing or caring about things is more fundamental to understanding values than are experiences of value, for many things can be good which are not directly encountered in experience, but are known only through theory or description (Johnston 1989, p. 142). No particular qualities of experience need to accompany knowledge of the literacy rate, the justice of patterns or processes of wealth distribution, or the stability of habitats for endangered species. What makes such things candidates for goodness seems to be that we can care about them or value them.

To value something is to have a complex of positive attitudes toward it, governed by distinct standards for perception, emotion, deliberation, desire, and conduct. People who care about something are emotionally involved in what concerns the object of care. Parents who love their children will normally be happy when their children are successful and alarmed when they are injured. They will be alert to their needs, take their welfare seriously in their deliberations, and want to take actions that express their care. These all express the way loving parents value their children.

To experience something as valuable and to value it are not to judge that it is valuable. A person may laugh at a racist joke, but be embarrassed at her laughter. Her embarrassment reflects a judgment that her amusement was not an appropriate response to the joke. The joke was not genuinely good or funny: it did not merit laughter. A person could also judge that a joke is funny, but be so depressed that she can't bring herself to laugh at it. Such a judgment could be the occasion of further depression, because it makes her aware of her own deficient state of mind, too miserable even to appreciate a good joke.

These observations support the following proposal: to judge that something is good is to judge that it is properly valued. And to judge that it is bad is to judge that it is properly disvalued. Often people judge that something is good in some particular respect, as in being charming, or inventive. I suggest that the proposition "x is F," where F is a respect in which something is judged to be genuinely valuable, entails that x meets a particular standard F, and that x merits valuation in virtue of meeting F.¹ One intrinsically values something when one values it in itself—that is,

apart from valuing anything else. I propose that the judgment that x is intrinsically valuable entails that (under normal conditions) x is properly intrinsically valued, independent of the propriety of valuing any other particular thing. Extrinsic values include but are not confined to instrumental values. One may treasure an ugly, useless gift because it was given by a loved one. Such a gift is extrinsically valuable, in that one's valuation of it depends upon one's valuation of the giver.

Reflective value judgments commit one to certain forms of self-assessment which are embodied in second-order attitudes, or attitudes about other attitudes. As we saw above, one may be embarrassed or depressed by one's failure to respond appropriately to what one judges to be good. One may be pleased by or proud of one's appropriate valuations. I propose that this is so because the concepts of meriting valuation and being properly valued are rationality concepts. When we wonder whether something is appropriately valued, we wonder whether *we* would be making sense in valuing it. On my view, the investigation into what is worth our caring about is a quest for self-understanding, an attempt to make sense of our own valuational responses to the world. In §5.1, I will tie the project of rational self-understanding to social practices of justification. Here I will offer a provisional account of the story to come. The link between self-understanding and justification is provided by the fact that valuations are expressive states. They are bearers of meanings and subject to interpretation. Since meanings are public, I can understand my own attitudes only in terms that make sense to others. Attitudes are also partly constituted by norms that determine their proper objects. So the interpretation of attitudes involves their evaluation as well. I will argue that people interpret and justify their valuations by exchanging reasons for them with the aim of reaching a common point of view from which others can achieve and reflectively endorse one another's valuations. To judge that one's valuations make sense is to judge that they would be endorsed from that hypothetical point of view. To be rational is to be suitably responsive to reasons offered by those attempting to reach that point of view.

The terms in which we make sense of our valuations are given by our evaluative concepts. The opening of this chapter sampled some of the rich variety of concepts through which we describe evaluative experiences and express value judgments. Call a person's values whatever standards she accepts for evaluating persons, actions, and things. Evaluation is the process by which a person judges how far and in what ways different things meet her standards. An object's values consist of whatever properties it has, in virtue of which it meets various standards of value. I have proposed that

the judgment that an object meets an authentic standard of value entails that its meeting that standard makes it sensible for someone to value it. The standards of value for objects are standards of rationality for our responses to them. One of my values could be that bedrooms be cozy. If a given bedroom is cozy, then coziness is a value it has. Its coziness gives me a reason to feel comfortable in it and makes sense of my feeling snug when I retire there. Standards rationally adjust our valuations to their appropriate objects.

Although all authentic values set standards for rational valuation, not every rational valuation of something depends upon its meeting some standard of value (Gaus 1990, pp. 70–71). Some ways of caring about things do depend upon their measuring up to particular standards of value—people don't admire athletes or musicians who lack dedication and skill—but other ways of valuing things do not. Parental love is like this. Parents can love infants independent of any valuable qualities they may have. Of course, loving another person will usually involve delight in some of that person's qualities, as when parents rave over the fact that little Melissa has her father's eyes. But this doesn't imply that the parents think that having father's eyes merits anyone's raving, much less that their love for Melissa depends upon her having her father's eyes. Rather, parents express their love for an infant in part by adoring whatever features she has which can be adored. These features need not merit valuation in their own right: parents can dote even on an ugly face.

It follows that we have two conceptions of goods that do not exactly coincide. On one view, a good is something that is appropriately valued. On the second, a good is a bearer or bundle of qualities that meet certain standards or requirements we (correctly) set for it (Mackie 1977, pp. 55–56). The second conception defines a subset of the objects that fall under the first: those things that *merit* valuation by meeting prior standards of value. But the first conception is more basic, for it can be appropriate to value some things or persons in certain ways without their meeting independent standards of evaluation—that is, without their meriting valuation.

The two conceptions of goods lead to two conceptions of the plurality of goods. On the first, goods are plural in that they are sensibly valued in fundamentally different ways. The opposing monistic view holds that all goods are the proper objects of a single evaluative attitude, such as desire, pleasure, or admiring contemplation. On the second conception, goods are plural in that the authentic evaluative standards they meet are fundamentally diverse. The opposing monistic view maintains that the apparently diverse standards for rational valuation can be reduced to some single

ground or explained by reference to a single good-constituting property, such as being desired or pleasant. The first conception of pluralism is more basic than the second because it explains why the second is true: we need a plurality of standards to make sense of the plurality of emotional responses and attitudes we have to things. The things that sensibly elicit delight are not generally the same things that merit respect or admiration. Our capacities for articulating our attitudes depend upon our understandings of our attitudes, which are informed by norms for valuation. To attempt to reduce the plurality of standards to a single standard, ground, or good-constituting property threatens to obliterate the self-understandings in terms of which we make sense of and differentiate our emotions, attitudes, and concerns. To adopt a monistic theory of value as our self-understanding is to hopelessly impoverish our responsive capacities to a monolithic “pro” or “con” attitude or to mere desire and aversion.

In identifying what is good with the proper objects of positive valuation, my theory follows Franz Brentano's. Brentano (1969, p. 18) held that an object is good if and only if it is correct to love it, and bad if and only if it is correct to hate it. My theory adds two main points to Brentano's. First, it views the concept of “correctness” as a rationality concept, tied to the quest for rational self-understanding. My theory of value could be called a “rational attitude theory,” according to which the attitudes engaged when we care about things involve not just feelings but judgment, conduct, sensitivities to qualities in what we value, and certain ways of structuring deliberation concerned with what we value.² Second, there is not just one way to love or have a “pro-attitude” toward things. There are different forms of love, such as romantic, parental, and fraternal, and there are ways of valuing things that are not love at all, such as respect and admiration. The variety of ways of caring about things is the source of pluralism in my theory of value.

1.2 Ideals and Self-Assessment

Valuing and evaluation are distinct activities. In evaluation, people determine how far something meets the particular standards they set for it. In valuing something, people meet certain standards for caring about it, although they may be unaware of, may not endorse, and may not try to govern their actions by those standards. A person could think something but judge himself contemptible for caring about it. Max could discover to his dismay that he is absorbed in vanity, even though he judges his vanity contemptible.

regard whether she cares about them or loses interest in them. In the latter case, whether she cares about them can reflect well or poorly on herself. A person sees her failure to live up to her core ideal aspirations in this light. Call goods of the former type weakly valued and those of the latter type strongly valued.³

People use ideals to cultivate and discipline their desires. Ideals function in this way because they are expressed in second-order desires, or desires to have or change other desires. If I uphold an ideal of integrity, I want myself to be motivated to stand up for my beliefs, and I want this desire to govern my actions even when it conflicts with my desire to maintain a favorable reputation. Not every second-order desire expresses an ideal. I could want to get rid of a desire simply because it is inconvenient. Perhaps my desire to linger on the telephone prevents me from getting on with my evening. Here I engage only my weak valuations, for I regard the desires in question as merely optional. I could choose to adopt a more leisurely attitude toward my affairs rather than to get rid of my desire to carry on with my friends over the phone. But I don't regard my desire for integrity as merely optional. No simple, unobjectionable change of perspective is available which would allow me to pander to others' opinions when my integrity is at stake. If I lack the desire for certain weakly valued ends, such as physical comfort, this might make me weird or quirky but not worthy of contempt. If I lack the desire for strongly valued ends, such as integrity, this makes me base or deplorable in my own eyes.⁴

In telling us how to value different goods, and in tying our valuations to our judgments of self-worth, ideals help structure the world of goods into different kinds. They draw boundaries between different classes of goods, setting them into circulation within distinct networks of social relations governed by distinct norms. This differentiation of ways of valuing things, socially embodied in different social spheres, provides the key to understanding how goods differ in kind.

Start

1.3 How Goods Differ in Kind (I): Different Modes of Valuation

Kant's moral philosophy provides a particularly illuminating example of how goods differ in kind: "In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; . . . whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity" (Kant 1981, p. 40). In this passage Kant expresses the view that there are two kinds of value, relative worth and intrinsic worth. Everything is either a mere means, with a price or

relative value, or an end in itself, with an intrinsic worth which Kant calls "dignity." Things that differ in the kind of worth they have merit different kinds of valuation. People value mere means by using them, but they value persons with dignity by respecting them. People express these different modes of valuation in part by deliberating about their objects in different ways—engaging in prudential calculation for use-values and in deliberation according to the categorical imperative for ends-in-themselves.

Kant's ideal of human rationality grounded his distinction between the way we should value persons and the way we should value things. By considering other ideals that are widely recognized in U.S. culture, we can see that Kantian ethics is hampered by the fact that it recognizes only two ways of valuing things, use and respect. These two modes of valuation are not enough to account for the richness of our experiences of value and our practices. Three examples from his *Lectures on Ethics*, concerning the status of animals, inanimate nature, and adultery, illustrate some problems a two-valued ethic has in attempting to account for our concerns in a many-valued world (Kant 1979, pp. 239–241, 169). Although Kant recognized aesthetic value as a distinct category of non-moral worth, he failed to see that even the domain of morality is many-valued.

Animals cannot be respected in a Kantian ethic, for to respect something in the Kantian sense is to act toward it in accordance with laws it would accept as a legislating member of the Kingdom of Ends. Animals are incapable of entering into the reciprocal relations based upon a conscious acceptance of common principles which membership in the Kingdom of Ends requires. But Kant's conclusion does not follow—that animals are mere means and may be used by us for any purpose that does not violate our duties to humans. We shouldn't be cruel to animals. Kant tried to account for this commonsense view by arguing that we have an indirect duty to humans to refrain from animal cruelty, because cruelty to animals makes us more likely to treat humans cruelly.

This attempt to account for our duties to animals is strained. If someone is cruel to her pet, people condemn her action whether or not this behavior will increase her cruelty to people. Neither Kantian respect nor mere use captures the appropriate treatment of pets. The ideal of a pet owner includes much more than even the avoidance of cruelty and the provision of basic necessities—we criticize an owner for failing to show proper affection for her pet. Although we make fewer demands for our treatment of animals in the wild, there is a base line of care which we should show for all animals. I suggest that we call this

kind of valuation "consideration." Consideration is a way of caring which pays due regard for the interests of sentient beings, apart from whether they are rational.⁵

Kant also regarded inanimate nature as a mere means. The only duty we have to conserve natural habitats follows from our duty to leave future generations enough resources. Kant saw no reason to preserve natural habitats from destruction through consumption, only reason to ration this destruction over time. In the United States today, we recognize ideals expressed in environmental movements to preserve ecosystems and natural wonders which express a deeper concern for nature. Most U.S. citizens view the redwoods and the Grand Canyon as beautiful and wondrous things to be intrinsically valued. To regard these wonders only from the standpoint of their use-value to humans is base. But inanimate nature can neither be respected in a Kantian sense nor given the consideration owed to animals, since it has no interests of its own. What seems to be an appropriate mode of valuation for inanimate nature is rather what we may call "appreciation."

A third problem for Kantian ethics concerns the difference between the badness of cheating on a business deal and the badness of cheating on one's husband or wife. Kant condemned both actions for one reason: they reflect a lack of respect for persons. He argued that adultery is a graver sin than fraud because the marriage contract is more important than any business contract. This does not explain why the victims of these acts typically experience different kinds of diminishment. The significance of adultery seems to lie not so much in its failure of respect—which it shares with fraud—as in its betrayal of love. Modern ideals of marriage demand of partners deeper forms of care for each other than commercial contracts do. When these forms of care are no longer forthcoming, their loss is felt more personally.

Use, respect, appreciation, consideration, and love are five different ways of valuing things. A little reflection suggests more modes of valuation, such as honor, admiration, reverence, and toleration. We are familiar with numerous modes and expressions of disvaluation as well: to shun, humiliate, mock, despise, ignore, desecrate, and so forth. My provisional account of how goods differ in kind is thus that they differ in kind if they are properly valued in different ways. Talk of different kinds of goods may be somewhat misleading, if we think of kinds as non-interbreeding species. I think of kinds of goods as more like literary genres: they can be hybridized, like the comedy-thriller; they can stand in different relations to different audiences, as heroic odes do to oral and written cultures; and

they can be categorized differently by different cultures, as myths are by cultures having and lacking a scientific cosmology.

Ideals tell individuals how they should value different things, depending on their value and personal importance. Some goods merit a particular mode of valuation because they meet a standard of value: beautiful things are worthy of appreciation, rational beings of respect, sentient beings of consideration, virtuous ones of admiration, convenient things of use. Here the pluralism of values or standards underwrites the pluralism of kinds of goods. Other goods are appropriately valued in a particular way because of their relation to the valuing agent, which makes them important to him. People who have helped someone are owed gratitude, brothers and sisters are to be loved, one's children to be nurtured. Romantic love, patriotism, loyalty, the treasuring of heirlooms, and the cherishing of friends are modes of valuation connected to importance judgments, not just to impersonal value judgments. Here the kind of good a thing is for a person depends on her particular biography and social situation, her place in a network of relationships.

To value or care about something in a particular way involves a complex of standards for perception, emotion, deliberation, desire, and conduct that *express* and thereby communicate one's regard for the object's importance. To love someone involves the performance of many actions which *express* that love, which show the beloved that he or she has a special importance to the lover. It entails particular ways of deliberating about questions concerning what is valued, questions which distinctively engage the agent's perceptual dispositions and set certain considerations in priority over others. Parental love involves perceiving and attending to a child's needs and wants and giving the child's needs a certain priority in deliberation (over his wants and over other concerns). Finally, a mode of valuation includes distinctive emotional responses to the apprehension, achievement, and loss of things related to what is valued. Romantic love involves feeling grief when the beloved dies, despondency at her lack of reciprocation, exultation at her confession of a reciprocal love, jealousy when her affections are turned to another, alarm at her being harmed. These different ways of flourishing and suffering with regard to the beloved show her that she is loved, as opposed to merely liked or tolerated.

END

1.4 How Goods Differ in Kind (II): Social Relations of Realization

I have thus far explained how goods differ in kind in terms of the different ways people properly care about them. Individuals are not self-sufficient in

~~of importance also imply that the ways one person should value a particular thing or person need not be the ways another person should value it or him. The respects in which anything is properly valued, and the ways and circumstances in which it makes sense to value it, remain problems. In introducing the notion that goods differ in kind, I suggest that these are the kinds of problems we should be posing ourselves, not that the answers are to be found in establishing a rigid classification of things into kinds.~~

My socially grounded, ideal-based, pluralistic theory of value goes against the grain of a long philosophical tradition. Philosophy has traditionally expressed impatience with the pluralistic, contestable, historically contingent and socially informed evaluative practices in which ordinary people participate. Since Socrates, a common philosophical aspiration has been to find some means of grasping the good or the right directly, unmediated by the pluralistic hodgepodge of socially particular evaluative concepts and ideals (Plato 1961a). To reach sound ethical judgments, we are thought to require an entirely new mode of ethical justification, independent of the historical and social contingencies in which commonsense evaluative reasoning is mired. Many motivations support this aspiration: the determination to make value judgments unconditionally universal (Plato 1961a) or to represent them as subject only to purely personal intuition (Moore 1903); to overcome ethical disagreement (Bentham 1948; Plato 1961b); to find a determinate rational decision procedure in ethics (Bentham 1948; Brandt 1979; Hare 1981; Harsanyi 1982); to naturalistically reduce "values" to "facts" (Brandt 1979; Railton 1986); to enable critical reflection on our own practices (Brandt 1979; Hare 1981). The attempt to bypass the varieties of pluralism I affirm leads to a monistic or drastically reductionist theory of value.

In emphasizing the intimate connections between the plurality of our evaluative attitudes and the plurality of our ideals, evaluative concepts, and social practices, I aim to highlight the problems involved in adopting such monistic and reductionist programs. If we bypass the plurality of values and ideals in attempting to get a direct grasp on what is good and right, we will lose the resources to make sense of our attitudes and even to have highly differentiated and nuanced attitudes. We could be reduced to expressing a crudely generic "pro-" or "con-" attitude. Monistic theories of value tend to overlook this problem, because they assume that value is normative for just one attitude or response, such as desire, mere liking, or being pleased. It is no accident that the moral psychologies of such monists rarely acknowledge the existence, much less the importance, of ~~other~~ ^{attitudes} besides their favored one (§§6.2–6.4). But if it makes sense

for us to have a variety of evaluative attitudes, we can't do without our commonsense pluralistic practices. Monism is inherently defective, because it cannot make sense of the phenomena of values and valuation that any theory of value must account for.

Some of the following chapters will be devoted to elaborating this argument, considering monistic replies to it, and defending pluralism against monistic challenges. My larger ambition is to explore some of the practical implications of my socially grounded, pluralistic rational attitude theory of value. In the next three chapters, I will show how it supports an alternative to the dominant theories of rational choice. In the last three chapters, I will explore some of the political implications of pluralism. In providing an account of how economic goods differ in kind from other kinds of goods, pluralism sharpens our view of the ethical limitations of the market and helps us determine what goods should and should not be treated as commodities.

End

appropriately distribute her concern among the different persons and things she properly cares about in acting. The diachronic norm tells a person to act in such a way that over time her actions can be fit into a coherent narrative (MacIntyre 1981, ch. 15; Velleman 1991). The demands of this norm have only recently begun to be explored. Thus, I will suggest only that the coherence of a narrative of one's life will depend upon an account of how our valuations and evaluations can rationally evolve and develop in the light of new experience (Anderson 1991). Both of these global norms are regulative ideals, which can rarely, if ever, be completely satisfied. Many conflicts arise when we cannot satisfy the demands of caring about one person without violating the demands of caring about another, or when we no longer have the context or resources to coherently continue our lives.

I have argued that only in the context of a decision frame do particular consequences of actions emerge as relevant for evaluating action. This is because the consequences of action generally have no intrinsic value. Their importance emerges only in a setting in which an agent's rational attitudes toward people and things are interpreted through a decision frame. But what determines the rational choice of a decision frame? Ideals that embody conceptions of how goods differ in kind play an indispensable role here.

Recall that the plurality of goods arises from the fact that people care about different goods in different ways, care about the ways they care about goods, and institutionalize different ways of caring about goods by embedding them in distinct social practices of production, distribution, and enjoyment. These social practices are governed by norms that highlight some features of the goods in question as important for action concerning them and subordinate others. In classifying a good as one kind or another, by embedding it in one set of social practices over another, people select the relevant decision frames which will be applied to it. For example, to classify dogs as pets is to call for decision frames regarding dogs as proper objects of affection and domestication and to rule out decision frames which consider their edibility, or their potential life in the wild, as relevant to choices concerning them. To adopt the ideal of being an outstanding defense lawyer in an adversary system of justice is to call for decision frames that reject the justice of punishing one's guilty clients as a consideration important to preparing a defense before trial. Thus, a fundamental implication of the thesis that goods differ in kind is that people should deliberate about them in different ways, according to different frames. In determining which frame a person should use to describe the

options at hand, she consults how she cares about the people concerned with the options, her ideals of how she ought to care about them, and the social roles she occupies that embody these ideals.

People tend to take decision frames for granted because they are often embodied in habits and social roles. Social role differentiation, in enabling people to occupy different roles at different times and places, enables them to establish different priorities in different parts of their lives. The "same" action described in terms of its consequences can have a different expressive significance, and hence a different degree of appropriateness, depending on the social context in which it is performed. When a parent sets aside his child's demands for attention in order to deal with a client's needs, it typically makes a big difference for the expressive meaning, and therefore the appropriateness of the act, whether the parent should be acting in his role as parent or in his role as businessperson at that time, and this in turn typically but not always depends upon whether he is at home or at work. In the former case, the act is more likely to express an inappropriate neglect or indifference toward his child than in the latter.

What things a person cares about, as well as how and how much she cares about them, are not solely a function of the social practices, roles, and relationships she participates in. Her character, history, mood, energy, actions, and reading of her predicament play a profound part in influencing what she values, especially in influencing which practices, roles, and relationships she will make her own, how she will interpret, criticize, and change them, and so forth. In emphasizing how a person's ways of valuing things are structured through social roles, practices, and relationships, I do not want to imply that these structures are to be regarded as simply given to agents, unmediated by their own understandings, or beyond critical scrutiny. Although decision frames embedded in social roles are frequently taken for granted, it is often important to make them an object of deliberation. Do the norms constitutive of these frames adequately express the ways we should value the persons whose interests are at stake in the choices they guide? The parent/worker example presented above offers material for deliberation about appropriate decision frames, since society does not structure social roles and decision frames suitable for parents of either gender. It assigns different meanings to mothers and fathers making the same tradeoffs of work and parental responsibilities, which express such views as that children need to be with mothers more than fathers, that mothers and fathers should value their children differently, and that paid work is more important to fathers than mothers. As these judgments, along with the gender hierarchies they

responsible for when either of us is in a position to cause or prevent them. These concepts all mark distinctions in the expressive significance of actions and, hence, bear upon their appropriateness within the terms of expressive theory. Deliberately tripping someone is worse than accidentally doing so, because the former expresses contempt or hatred for someone, whereas the latter does not. Committing adultery with a stranger's husband is expressively worse than failing to prevent him from committing adultery with someone else. In the latter case, one may properly be respecting others' privacy, including the victim's, but committing adultery cannot express respect for the victim. Yet these distinctions do not track differences in the consequences of the actions or happenings they are applied to: in either case, a tripping or a betrayal has occurred. (Granted, people are more likely to take offense at a deliberate tripper or the adulterer, but it isn't evident what consequentialists are to make of this. For the grounds for offense presuppose an expressive logic not itself endorsed by consequentialists. The world may be better off if people didn't respond differently to actions with the same consequences.) Because the concepts marking these distinctions do not track differences in consequences, they cannot be fundamental to a consequentialist theory. At best, their use in guiding moral practice could be justified indirectly, as leading to better consequences overall.

Start
Example
Expressive norms are backward-looking: what it makes sense to do now essentially depends on what one has done in the past. This follows from the requirement of narrative unity (§2.2). The past sets a context that confers expressive meaning on present choices. Had the past been different, the same present act could have a different meaning and therefore a different appropriateness. Consider a couple who struggle for years through long workdays and financial difficulties to establish a distinctive family restaurant. Now, just as the restaurant is at the threshold of steady success, a franchise operation wants to buy it from them and build dozens of similar restaurants around the country. In return for relinquishing control of the restaurant, they would get far more money than they could by continuing to operate it. The couple might think of their choice as follows: Selling the restaurant would offer them important financial security, but it would also undermine the point of their lives' personal investments and struggles, which were aimed not just at making money but at creating an alternative to the humdrum, homogenized, and predictable chain restaurants taking over the area. Dropping their life projects for this reason would leave them with life stories as "successful" sell-outs, rather than as people who had made something of their early struggles and

fulfilled the dream of a lifetime. They did not work all those years to make millions for some brand-x corporation. A concern for the narrative unity of their lives, for what meaning their present choices make of their past actions, could rationally motivate them to turn down the offer.

Consequentialist theories reject this kind of reasoning. The point of action is to maximize value, and action realizes value only through its future consequences. Consequentialists view the couple's reasoning as irrationally weighing "sunk costs" in their calculations. If a greater amount of future good can be achieved by taking up an entirely new path than it could by sticking with one's past investments and personal commitments, one should disregard the past and take the option with the greater future payoff. This does not mean that people should weigh only crude material gains in their calculations. If having alternatives to mass-produced commercialism in restaurants is a good thing, perhaps because it gives the town a certain charm, this consideration counts in a calculation of future good. The consequentialist point is that it should count no differently for a couple who had devoted their lives to promoting it than for a couple who judge that it is as good as the devotees say, but who had just come into the restaurant by inheritance. The meanings a choice confers on one's past actions are irrelevant to the future payoffs, which are by hypothesis the same in either case.

Another distinctive feature of expressive norms is their distributive structure. They tell people to express their concerns toward each person, animal, or thing for the sake of which they act. Concern is something people distribute to each of their ends. It is not an attitude that is held only toward some aggregate. Consequentialist norms, by contrast, have an aggregative structure: they tell people to maximize something. As the utilitarian population paradoxes show, the distributive structure of expressive norms typically imposes constraints on a person's maximizing behavior, since not every way of maximizing something expresses the appropriate respect, benevolence, or other attitudes we owe to each person affected by our actions.

The distributive character of expressive norms explains some phenomena that are thought to be puzzling from a consequentialist point of view. It explains why it can make sense to feel ambivalence, regret, or guilt over a decision we rightly judge to be the best, all things considered (Williams 1981a; Stocker 1990, ch. 4). The expressive view calls for mixed feelings toward an action whenever the diverse ends for the sake of which we act are not each properly and adequately served by it. For example, one may feel both satisfaction and guilt in the same action, if this action both

fact that a state of affairs is an object of a person's already unified preferences is what makes it intrinsically valuable (immediately normative for choice). A choice or action is rational if and only if it tends to bring about the person's rationally preferred states of affairs.

The instrumental theory can explain the rational coherence of preferences with choices and true value judgments, provided that its conception of intrinsic value can support the strong ordering principles of completeness and transitivity. I will argue in §3.3 that these principles cannot be sustained. The instrumental theory runs into deeper trouble in attempting to account for the rational unity of our emotions, attitudes, internalized norms, intentions, and ways of deliberating. In unifying a person's preferences and choices around the achievement of particular consequences, the instrumental view creates discord among other aspects of the self.

Consider the cases that arose in contrasting consequentialist and expressive views in §2.4. The paradox of hedonism shows that consequentialism may require a person to aim at ends that aren't really valuable, so that the really intrinsically valuable states of affairs can be produced as an unintended by-product. It may require people to focus on and intrinsically care about what, from its own perspective, is not really or ultimately important. The tripping and adultery cases show that consequentialism has difficulty making sense of the different emotional reactions we actually have to the same consequences brought about through different means. The rationally justified emotion is that which constitutes or causes the best states of affairs. But, as the above cases show, the emotions people actually have are responsive not to consequentialist but rather to expressive considerations. People can't reflectively endorse an emotional state which is induced by mechanisms or thoughts that don't internally warrant it on expressive grounds, even if consequentialism says it would be instrumentally good to have that state. In other words, the instrumental account of what makes an emotional state rational cannot provide a coherent basis for self-understanding.

This fact is abundantly illustrated in popular cultural representations of androids and robots, who exhibit the purely instrumental, calculative, unemotional rationality extolled by consequentialism and thereby reveal themselves to be social clods and emotional dolts. Lieutenant Commander Data, an android officer of the Starship Enterprise on the television series "Star Trek: The Next Generation," provides a case in point. Attempting to forge his first romantic relationship with a woman, he feigns anger and picks a fight with her for no apparent reason. She objects to his behavior, pointing out that she has done nothing to warrant such anger. Data replies

that he knows this perfectly well. The point of his instigating a fight was not to express any real objections he had to her but to establish an occasion for reconciliation after a falling out: his anthropological studies had taught him that such events tend to strengthen and deepen romantic friendships. She politely tells him that their relationship simply can't make sense if conducted on these terms. Data failed to grasp that the instrumental value of emotions and of the acts that express or elicit them is parasitic upon people understanding them in terms of the non-consequentialist, expressive logic of appropriateness. If his anger isn't proper and sincere, and if their reconciliation is not based on a mutual agreement about what behaviors warrant anger, on sincere apologies by whoever misbehaved or misjudged the other, and on resolutions to act and feel appropriately as judged in terms of expressive logic, it won't be an authentic reconciliation on the basis of which the relationship can coherently continue. End

The same failures of reflective coherence mark other proposals to reform ordinary practices along consequentialist lines. Blame should be meted out to wrongdoers only if it would deter future wrongdoing, and to anyone else unlucky enough to be in a position where being made an example of (however unjustly) would deter further wrongdoing (Smart 1973, pp. 69-71). Honors and prizes should not be meted out to those who merit them, if distributing them on some other basis would produce better consequences, say, by raising the self-esteem of those who don't merit them. Again, these manipulations of expressive practices can have their intended effects only if people think they are being governed in accord with expressive logic. Blame will rationally inspire outrage and resentment rather than guilt if people know it is being assigned on grounds of expedience rather than justice. Prizes will hardly inspire self-esteem if people know that they are awarded just to make them feel better, because the prize-giving would then express a misguided, patronizing "benevolence" rather than genuine honor or admiration. Consequentialist reasoning does not provide a coherent basis for us to understand and reflectively endorse our own emotions and attitudes. Expressive reasoning does provide such a ground for rational self-understanding.

If the practices and relationships that require an expressive self-understanding are intrinsically valuable by consequentialist lights, then consequentialism recommends that we adopt the expressive theory for our own self-understanding, even if it is false. This move creates a dramatic division between the consequentialist standpoint of authentic justification and the purportedly mistaken standpoint we are supposed to take up for purposes of deliberation, self-evaluation, and self-government. Consequentialism